Serbia – Solar – The Strange Case of the Wandering Solar Park of Merdare

A moving story

Early in the afternoon of Monday, 22 August 2011, the Serbian news agency Beta published a story about the imminent construction of what is being billed as the “first solar power plant in Kuršumlija”: “Prva solarna elektrana u Kuršumliji”.  The plant is to be built by the Italian firm “Multienerdži” (Multienergy) at a place called Matarova, a village in the southern Serbian municipality of Kuršumlija that is situated just 1.5 km east of the border of the province of Kosovo.  According to Beta, the installed capacity of the Matarova solar power plant will be 2 MWp, it will be built on 400 hectares of land, it is expected to produce 2.5 million kWh (2.5 GWh) of electricity annually, and the investment will amount to roughly € 5 million.  Beta quotes the company’s director, Ms. Verica Ristić, as saying that the solar park will be built “by the beginning of October”.  But the article also quotes the company’s president, Mr. Djovani Filpini [sic], as saying that the facility will be built within 60 days of all permits being obtained, and likewise quotes an economic development official for the municipality of Kuršumlija, Mr. Dejan Jovanović, as saying that the construction permit has not yet been obtained but should be obtained “soon”.

This story is important not so much for the energy news that it announces as for the splendid example it provides of the uncompromising laziness and sloppiness of journalistic reporting on energy matters in the Balkans, and in Serbia in particular.  Not one of the numerous news sites that republished or translated the news from Beta realized that 400 hectares (4 square kilometers!) would be an insanely large area for a photovoltaic power plant of 2 MWp.  (New PV plants today typically occupy about 1-2 hectares per megawatt, so a plant of 2 MW would typically take up about 2-4 hectares.)  What is worse, none of them realized that this entire story was simply a slightly updated regurgitation of a story first published three months earlier.

In fact the company that is now promising to build the “first solar power plant in Kuršumlija” at the village of Matarova was promising, back in May 2011, to build the “first solar power plant in Serbia” at the Kuršumlija village of Merdare.  But if we consider that 1) the village of Matarova is situated immediately to the north of the village of Merdare in the municipality of Kuršumlija, 2) the Kuršumlija area lies in an obscure corner of Serbia where very few energy projects get undertaken, and 3) the Merdare plant was supposed to be completed by September or October and the Matarova plant is expected to be completed by the beginning of October, then we probably would be justified in concluding that the two projects are one and the same.

 Merdare (from kWh)

Indeed the Merdare story was first published by Beta itself on 11 May 2011: “Merdare dobija solarnu elektranu”.  In this story the plant is billed as “the first solar park in Serbia”, the cost of the project is expected to be roughly € 5 million, and the installed capacity will be 2 MWp.  Six days later, on 17 May, a more complete article was published by the national television network RTS, including a 2-minute video segment shown on the national evening news.  Here the details given for the Merdare project are an installed capacity of 2 MWp, an area of 4 hectares, an investment of roughly € 5 million, and annual production of roughly 2.5 million kWh.  The RTS article places emphasis on how the arrival of Serbia’s first PV plant in this obscure but sunny region will turn the local economy around and reverse the exodus of young people from the area, and will create jobs.  (The Italian investors must have forgotten to inform the local development officials that even in Italy a PV plant of 2 MWp will have, at most, perhaps one full-time security guard.)  Finally the national power company itself, EPS, published in the May 2011 issue of its monthly magazine kWh a short article on the Merdare project where, apparently for the first time, we see the area of the project given as 400 hectares and the name of the Italian president of Multienergy (Giovanni Filippini) mistakenly converted into Serbian not as “Filipini” but as “Filpini”.

Perhaps the most surprising thing about both news events – both the Multienergy “Merdare” news blitz of May 2011 and the Multienergy “Matarova” blitz of earlier this week – is that no one in the press seems to have had the slightest inclination to find out more about this company, “Multienergy”, and its Italian investors.

Who or what is “Multienergy”?

A quick check of the records of the Serbian Business Registers Agency reveals that Multienergy (Multienergy Consulting d.o.o.) was founded in Belgrade and entered in the business register on 2 February 2011:

Multienergy Consulting d.o.o.

Skadarska 51, Beograd-Stari Grad, Serbia

Registry code (Јмб):	20708697
Tax number:	106933086
Registry date:	02.02.2011
Registry number:	БД 10829/2011
Founding date:	02.02.2011

Portion of Serbian Business Registers Agency extract

The company is owned 25% each by four Italian passport holders: Sonia Grigolato, Diego Grigolato, Giovanni Filippini, and Davide Rosina.  On 28 January 2011 these four Italian citizens each contributed € 250 (two hundred fifty euros) to found the company.  The company’s management consists of its director Vera Ristić (born in Serbia in 1960), who is required to obtain prior approval from the founder-shareholders for any transaction in excess of € 5,000. 

The firm’s accounting information is registered (with the same registry code number) to “Multienergy Consulting d.o.o. Novi Sad”, with an address at Maksima Gorkog 34, Novi Sad, Serbia.

Who are these four Italian investors?  Let us consider them in order.

First “Sonia Grigolato”.  In February of 2010 the Chamber of Commerce of the city of Mantova (Mantua) in Lombardia listed a “Sonia Grigolato” as the managing director of the inactive company C.I.P.E.R. S.r.l., located at Via dei Bersaglieri, 9, 46040 Casaloldo, Mantova.  In March 2011 the same Chamber of Commerce reported the conversion of the firm C.I.P.E.R. S.r.l. on 3 February 2011 into the firm Ecotec S.r.l., with the same address, managing director, and VAT number.

For “Diego Grigolato” nothing useful can be found on Google for Italy.

Ditto for “Giovanni Filippini”.

And “Davide Rosina”?  Here we strike paydirt.  There is a “Davide Rosina” who is managing director of the firm “MDM Solar S.p.A.”, a firm with the following contact information:

Via Padana Superiore 82/i
25080 Molinetto di Mazzano (BS)
Phone: (+39) 030 21 220 83
Fax: (+39) 030 51 099 89 

This firm offers investors the possibility to invest in small PV parks of 1 MWp – at least in Italy – so this could be the same “Davide Rosina” who is a 25% owner of Multienergy Consulting d.o.o.   Given that the Italian government's issuing of the Quarto Conto Energia in May largely killed off business for PV development studios in Italy, it would not be surprising if at about that same time an Italian PV developer began bringing together Italian investors to test the waters in the heretofore untapped market of Serbia.

Having a little innocent fun at the locals’ expense?

The Beta story on Merdare of 11 May, as reported by B92, stated that that area had been chosen for Serbia’s first solar plant because EPS reported that Kuršumlija has “the greatest number of sunny days annually” in Serbia, and this claim was repeated in the RTS report.  And yet eight months earlier, on 16 September 2010, the same B92 had published the news that a village named Velika Biljanica, five kilometers northeast of the city of Leskovac, had been chosen as the site for Serbia’s first solar plant because Serbia’s Republic Hydrometeorological Service had identified that spot as the sunniest around, with around 200 days of sunshine annually.  And Leskovac is about 50 kilometers from Kuršumlija, and slightly further south.  So either the national power company EPS has better insolation information than the Republic Hydrometeorological Service, or someone has been having a little fun at the expense of the poor folks of Kuršumlija.

Maps (click to enlarge):

From Mapa Srbije:

From PlanPlus - Digitalna mapa Srbije i Crne Gore:

From the Vojnogeografski institute 1:100,000 topographic map 631 Priština (1982-83):

Composite map from the Vojnogeografski institut 1:25,000 topographic maps 631-1-2 Priština 1-2 (Podujevo) (1972) and 631-2-1 Priština 2-1 (Mala Kosanica) (1972):

From the 1893 atlas of the Kingdom of Serbia at 1:75:000 by the Serbian General Staff: Ž 10, Podujevo: Beograd: Geografsko odeljenje Glavnog đeneralštaba, 1893:

 

References:

Odobrenje za solarnu elektranu

http://www.b92.net/info/vesti/index.php?yyyy=2010&mm=09&dd=16&nav_id=459070

četvrtak 16.09.2010 | 07:25

Merdare dobija solarnu elektranu

http://www.b92.net/biz/vesti/srbija.php?yyyy=2011&mm=05&dd=11&nav_id=511526

sreda 11.05.2011 | 17:28

Прва соларна електрана у Србији

http://www.rts.rs/page/stories/ci/story/56/%D0%A1%D1%80%D0%B1%D0%B8%D1%98%D0%B0+%D0%B4%D0%B0%D0%BD%D0%B0%D1%81/893292

уторак, 17. мај 2011, 15:19 -> 16:44

Италијани инвестирају у Мердаре

Прва соларна електрана

“kWh”, no. 448 (maj 2011), p. 19

http://www.eps.rs/publikacije/list_kwh/2011/broj_448_web.pdf

Prva solarna elektrana u Kuršumliji

http://www.b92.net/biz/vesti/srbija.php?yyyy=2011&mm=08&dd=22&nav_id=536665

ponedeljak 22.08.2011 | 14:09

Solar power plant in Kursumlija, Serbia

http://limun.hr/en/main.aspx?id=735957

23.8.2011 13:06:00

Serbia & Italy – Some Notes on the Future of the Electricity Market

On 2 July 2011 I posted to a LinkedIn group a link to an article in Serbian – “Дон Кихот побеђује у Србији” – about the possible impact on renewable energy development in Serbia of the revised energy law that is being prepared in Serbia.  (The draft of the energy law was formally submitted to the Serbian Parliament on 14 July, and is available at Предлог Закона о енергетици (PDF) or Predlog Zakona o energetici (HTML).)  On 9 July someone posted the following comment:

________,

Do you know what other options do the renewable energy producers in Serbia have to sell electricity, other than the PPA with the Serbian government based on the feed-in tariffs?

Something like a regional electricity spot market buyer or long term contracts with private electricity buyers comes to mind?

If so, what are the ongoing prices or pricing formulas?

I heard that the market price for electricity is around 20 cents per kw.

I also heard that the bilateral agreement between Italy and Serbia grants importers of electricity from Serbia to Italy the Italian feed-in tariffs.

If so, I am not sure what the feed-in tariffs are in Italy - specifically for solar energy.

For instance in the case of solar energy, feed-in tariffs could not even come near to make the investment in solar energy viable. Feed-in tariffs in Serbia guarantee 23 cents per kw, while break even point in most cases and technologies comes to low 30's

Mini Hydro on the other hand for instance makes more sense and can be profitable.

Cheers!

On 22 July I posted the following reply (slightly edited):

Dear ______,

Please excuse my delay in replying.  I am now in a position to try to respond to your questions.

Q1: “Do you know what other options do the renewable energy producers in Serbia have to sell electricity, other than the PPA with the Serbian government based on the feed-in tariffs?  Something like a regional electricity spot market buyer or long term contracts with private electricity buyers comes to mind?  If so, what are the ongoing prices or pricing formulas?”

I obtained the following reply today from someone in the Serbian government who until recently was closely involved with energy policy:

“Power producers are not obliged to sell power to the Government/EPS – it’s just an option for them.  They are allowed to export electricity, or to sell it to the energy dealers or someone else interested.  But it would be hard to do that in Serbia because EPS electricity price for consumers is around 5 eurocents and would be very hard to sell your electricity in Serbia and to beat EPS price.  Besides that, there is no spot market in Serbia or the region at the moment (except in Romania and Slovenia).”

Q2: “I heard that the market price for electricity is around 20 cents per kw.  I also heard that the bilateral agreement between Italy and Serbia grants importers of electricity from Serbia to Italy the Italian feed-in tariffs.  If so, I am not sure what the feed-in tariffs are in Italy - specifically for solar energy.”

Actually, at present there is no way to export electricity from the Balkans to Italy except by the 500 MW HVDC undersea cable from northern Greece (southern tip of Albania) to Otranto, the Arachthos-Galatina link.  (See the European grid map at ENTSO-E Grid Map.)  Italy’s Moncada Energy Group was planning to build a private, 500 MW “merchant cable” from southern Albania to Brindisi to export energy from a 500 MW wind park that Moncada was building at Vlorë in southern Albania, but that idea seems to have died on 7 September 2010 when the Brindisi city council denied landing rights for the cable.

There is also a plan to build a 1,000 MW HVDC cable from Montenegro (originally to start from Tivat, but now changed to Kotor) to Pescara in Italy.  See Pubblicato Accordo strategico dell'elettrodotto Italia-Montenegro (contains original documents in English) and Saopštenje: Objavljeni ugovori o realizaciji interkonektivne veze između elektroenergetskih sistema Republike Italije i Crne Gore.  (For additional documents, search on Google for “Terna site:www.mek.gov.me”, without quotation marks.)

The Kotor-Pescara cable project has now received official approval all around, and I imagine Terna S.p.A. will move forward with it.  Terna has agreed to ensure that the new connection will be completed and commissioned “no later than April 30, 2015”.  But I have strong doubts about this.  When the cable project from Tivat to Pescara was first announced there was considerable opposition to it in Italy.  First of all, energy consumption in Italy since 2007 has been flat, and with many GW of new renewable and carbon-fired power plants already due to come online in coming years it was clear that Italy had no need for additional electricity.   In addition, the plan was for the cable to come ashore at Pescara and for the electricity to then be transferred south hundreds of kilometers to Foggia (which is closer to Tivat), at considerably greater cost than a direct Tivat-Foggia cable.  So rumor had it that the Berlusconi administration desired this enormous 1-gigawatt cable from Pescara (in the middle of nowhere on the unpopulated back side of Italy) to Montenegro not to import energy from the Balkans, but to export to the Balkans electricity from a number of nuclear plants that the government desired to build.  The plan for the cable moved forward nonetheless, but in the meantime on 11 March 2011 the Fukushima disaster began, and in a nationwide referendum on 12-13 June the Italian electorate voted 94% in favor of maintaining the national ban on nuclear energy.

In short, what with the worsening financial, budgetary, and demographic situation in Italy, I rather doubt that anyone will get upset if Terna somehow forgets to construct this cable by 2015.

You posted your question before the beginning of Berlusconi’s recent planned visit to Serbia.  During the visit of the Italian delegation all sorts of documents were signed, including some regarding the export to Italy of energy produced by the hydro plants that the Italian firm Seci Energia S.p.A. has received a contract to build along the Ibar River in southern Serbia.  Nevertheless I have grave doubts about whether any of that will ever come about because 1) given that Seci Energia has never built or operated even a single hydro plant, its receiving a no-bid contract for 10 hydro plants worth € 820 million has the entire region murmuring about corruption, 2) as mentioned above, Italy already has too much energy, and the infrastructure connections between southern Serbia and Montenegro are not outstanding, 3) there will certainly be a lot of local opposition, similar to the local opposition that recently stopped construction of the Brodarevo 1 and Brodarevo 2 hydro plants in southern Serbia, and 4) money will have to be paid to construction companies for several years before any energy is actually produced, and right now the Italian ruling circles are terrified that if they do not introduce harsh enough budget austerity measures right away then the bond markets could easily treat Italy like Greece, causing a collapse of everything.

As for a promise of Italian feed-in tariffs being paid for electricity imported from Serbia, I am also skeptical of that.  Only the Italian parliament could approve such a thing, and I have heard nothing of such plans, and what with the way people in Italy are already complaining about high electric bills I think it is unlikely that the parliament would find the nerve to pay billions of euros to huge Italian firms to have them bring in unneeded energy from abroad.  (By the way, just last week Edison S.p.A. announced that it will now move forward with plans to construct a new, 817 MWe gas-fired power plant at Pianopoli near where I am.)

Q3: “For instance in the case of solar energy, feed-in tariffs could not even come near to make the investment in solar energy viable. Feed-in tariffs in Serbia guarantee 23 cents per kw, while break even point in most cases and technologies comes to low 30's.  Mini Hydro on the other hand for instance makes more sense and can be profitable.”

Well, I am afraid I cannot fully agree with your way of approaching the profitability of solar energy and other RES.  For solar energy an important element is insolation, which is why here in Italy, where FITs are the same nationwide, everyone wants to build solar parks here in the sunny south instead of up in the cloudy north.  Serbia, obviously, does not have great insolation.  But nearby countries that do have good insolation along the coast – Croatia, Montenegro, and Albania – do not have any incentives for large, ground mounted PV plants.  In Bosnia, FBiH pays FITs for only 12 years, and Republika Srpska still has no incentive system at all.  To the east, Bulgaria recently outlawed the construction of solar parks on good agricultural land.  So, given the economic/political situation in Greece and the political/criminal situation in Albania and Kosovo, as well as the rapidly falling solar FITs in Italy, Serbia might turn out to be (after Macedonia) one of the better investments for solar power in the region in coming years.

In addition, a life-or-death question in the siting of renewable energy projects is taxation of the incentives that one receives.  In Serbia and several neighboring countries the corporate earnings tax is just 10%, whereas in Italy there is a tax (IRAP) of roughly 4% on revenues plus a tax (IRES) of 27.5% on earnings, for a combined minimum of at least 31.5% of earnings.

Finally, I would beg to disagree about the “break even point in most cases and technologies”.  Two important renewable energy technologies are biogas and biomass.  For both of these there is very often a waste stream that someone wants to get rid of, and with biogas or biomass they have the possibility of converting that waste into electricity and/or heat (plus some exhaust gases) instead of having to pay someone to haul it away.  So in Serbia and surrounding countries there are already any number of agricultural and industrial facilities that are using biomass or biogas profitably without any incentives at all.  And of course hydroelectric power was already in use in the Balkans many decades before anyone began thinking of giving incentives to “renewable energy sources”.  And regarding wind power, we read in Wikipedia that “Small wind turbines for lighting of isolated rural buildings were widespread in the first part of the 20th century”, and that Vestas began selling wind turbines as long ago as 1979.

Bulgaria – Recent Legal Changes that Make Renewable Energy Projects Less Attractive

Recently someone asked me about the market for renewable energy in Bulgaria.  I wrote the following in response:

In fact Bulgaria had very strong potential for renewable energy up until recently, but changes in two laws over the last several weeks have made the situation much less attractive for investors.  Some of these changes were already being considered by the Parliament or the Ministries at the time of the announcement about Toshiba, which was one of my reasons for suspecting that the announcement regarding Toshiba was false.

The first event was the Parliament’s adoption on 21 April 2011 of a Law on Renewable Energy.  Here is the text of the new law:

Закон за енергията от възобновяеми източници

http://dv.parliament.bg/DVWeb/fileUploadShowing.jsp?&idFileAtt=103948&allowCache=true&openDirectly=false
http://www.parliament.bg/bg/laws/ID/11317/

http://www.lex.bg/bg/laws/ldoc/2135728864

http://www.theplan.comeze.com/14G7.pdf

Under the new law the government will change the feed-in tariffs (FITs) for new plants year by year, and plants that do not succeed in getting a place within the annual quota will receive a FIT on a case-by-case basis based on their construction costs.  In addition there is now a fee (see Чл. 29) when developers apply for a grid connection, though it is not very high.  See the following articles:

Bulgaria's New Renewable Energy Act Cools Down Investors' Hopes

21 April 2011

Bulgaria approves a new law on renewable energy

26 April 2011

Shocked Investors: New Law Shatters Bulgaria's Renewable Energy Sector

4 May 2011

The variability of the FITs is referred to in Art. 31, paragraph (1) of the law, which would translate as follows:

“Electricity from renewable sources is purchased by the public provider and end-suppliers, respectively, at the preferential price, set by the DKEVR, in force at the date of the act of findings for the completion of the energy facility pursuant to Art. 176, par. 1 of the Law on Spatial Planning.”

The second event was the Parliament’s adoption on 11 May of a number of amendments to the Law for the Protection of Agricultural Land.  Here is the text of the amendments:

Закон за изменение и допълнение на Закона за опазване на земеделските земи

Although the draft of the amendments that circulated last year would have excluded both solar and wind power from land of categories from 1 to 4 (i.e., all agricultural land), and in February the Minister of Agriculture and Food proposed publicly that they should be excluded from all land of categories from 1 through 8 (which would even include most of the unfertile land), in the end the government adopted the amendments on 21 April in a form that excluded only solar, and only from land of categories 1-4 (agricultural land).

The relevant exclusion is found at Art. 7, para. 2, which would translate as follows:

“(3) construction and/or expansion of facilities for production of electricity from renewable energy using photovoltaic (solar) systems, except when the production of electricity is for one’s own use, is permitted on non-irrigated arable land of the fifth to tenth categories or uncategorized land.”

See the following articles (only in Bulgarian, I have not run across any in English):

Дискриминация спрямо фотоволтаичната технология съзират от БФА

Публикуване: 09.05.2011, 15:55

Окончателно: Парламентът изхвърли соларните панели от плодородните земи

Последна промяна в 16:51 на 11 май 2011

Obviously the solar industry is not at all happy with this change.  Although this change has not received as much attention as the new renewable energy law – perhaps because Bulgaria has a large wind association but to date has little photovoltaic capacity installed – it effectively kills all hopes of large photovoltaic plants such as that huge one of 250 MWp that Toshiba was rumored to be planning, or even the modest one of 10 MWp that the company had already received approval for.

There is also a third event, which occurred last year.  On 22 July 2010 the Parliament adopted amendments to the Water Law.  The amendments can be found here:

Закон за изменение и допълнение на Закона за водите

http://www.parliament.bg/bg/laws/ID/10052

http://new.lex.bg/en/laws/ldoc/2135692090

The amended law can be found here:

Закон за водите

http://www.bd-ibr.org/files/File/500-Zakon_za_vodite.pdf (as amended through 6 August 2010; 139 pages, 10.5 MB)

http://rzi-smolyan.com/NormativhaUredba_files/ZV.doc (as amended through 5 April 2011; 143 pages)

http://www.dker.bg/files/DOWNLOAD/zv.pdf (as amended through 5 April 2011; 143 pages)

In the act adopted on 22 July 2010,  § 63 creates in the Water Law a new Art. 118g, which reads as follows:

"Art. 118g. (1) The withdrawal of surface water for electricity generation is not permitted:

1. in cascade structures for derivation and run-of-river hydroelectric plants; …”

According to the following articles, this and other changes to the Water Law (such as Art. 156a) have made it very difficult to build hydroelectric plants in protected areas of Bulgaria, a change which threatens many small hydro projects that had already received permits:

Забраниха “Горна Арда” и каскадите от вецове

Четвъртък, 22-ри Юли 2010

Закон спря строежа на вецове: Инвеститори ще съдят държавата за щети след въведената забрана

26 Септември 2010

Проекти за ВЕЦ буксуват заради ограничения

Дата: 24.2.2011

Italy – A Collection of My Comments on the Draft of the Quarto Conto Energia (Fourth Energy Account) for Photovoltaic Solar Energy in Italy (Part II)

I post here a subsequent comment that I posted to the same group regarding the Quarto Conto Energia.

Posto qui un commento che ho postato sullo stesso gruppo in merito al Quarto conto energia.

Me

2011-05-09  18:48

I commenti qui da Luay e Federico ci indicano che ci sono dei problemi nell’indennizzo di cui all’Articolo 7.  Sono andato quindi a trovare le fonti necessarie per poter calcolare l’importo (se possibile).

L’Articolo 7 dice che “si applicano le misure di indennizzo previste e disciplinate dalla delibera dell’Autorità per l’energia elettrica e il gas ARG/elt 181/10 e relativo Allegato A, e successive modifiche e integrazioni.”

Questa delibera “ARG/elt 181/10” si trova qui:

“Deliberazione 20 ottobre 2010 - ARG/elt 181/10: Attuazione del decreto del Ministro dello Sviluppo Economico, di concerto con il Ministro dell’Ambiente e della Tutela del Territorio e del Mare 6 agosto 2010, ai fini dell’incentivazione della produzione di energia elettrica mediante conversione fotovoltaica della fonte solare”

Ecco poi l’ “Allegato A”, comprese 29 successive modifiche fino alla ARG/elt 219/10:

“Allegato A: Testo integrato delle disposizioni dell’autorità per l’energia elettrica e il gas per l’erogazione dei servizi di trasmissione, distribuzione e misura dell’energia elettrica.  Periodo di regolazione 2008-2011”

 (Questo consiste di 76 pagine, e comprende delle formule molto complesse.)

Ecco infine la “integrazione” ARG/elt 225/10 del 3 dicembre 2010, che inserisce per la prima volta un indennizzo:

“Deliberazione 3 dicembre 2010 - ARG/elt 225/10: Integrazione dell’Allegato A alla deliberazione dell’Autorità per l’energia elettrica e il gas 20 ottobre 2010, ARG/elt 181/10, ai fini dell’attivazione degli indennizzi previsti dal decreto ministeriale 6 agosto 2010 in materia di impianti fotovoltaici”

In questa delibera ARG/elt 225/10 si trova il testo di un nuovo articolo – “Articolo 18” – che istituisce l’indennizzo.  Fortunatamente quest’articolo occupa solo 2 pagine.  Leggendo quest’articolo io noto quanto segue:

Se il ritardo eccessivo non è di più di 25 giorni lavorativi, allora secondo 18.6 l’indennizzo è più o meno quello già stabilito in precedenza nel TICA.  (N.B.: “TICA” qua sta per “Testo integrato delle connessioni attive”, un accorciamento di “Testo integrato delle condizioni tecniche ed economiche per la connessione alle reti elettriche con obbligo di connessione di terzi degli impianti di produzione di energia elettrica”. L’ultima versione del TICA che io trovo in questa pagina è quella a destra, indicata come “TICA valido dal 1.1.2011”.)  Nel TICA si trova il seguente:

“Indennizzi automatici

[…]

14.2 Qualora la realizzazione della connessione non avvenga entro i tempi previsti dal comma 10.1, tenuto conto di quanto previsto dai commi 10.2, 10.3 e 10.4, il gestore di rete, salvo cause di forza maggiore o cause imputabili al richiedente o a terzi, è tenuto a corrispondere al richiedente, a titolo di indennizzo automatico, un ammontare pari al valor massimo tra 20 euro al giorno e il 5% del totale del corrispettivo per la connessione determinato ai sensi dell’articolo 12 o 13 per ogni giorno lavorativo di ritardo della realizzazione della connessione fino ad un massimo di 120 (centoventi) giorni lavorativi. Nel caso in cui il predetto ritardo sia superiore a 120 (centoventi) giorni lavorativi, il richiedente può inviare una segnalazione all’Autorità per l’adozione dei provvedimenti di propria competenza, ivi inclusa, ove applicabile, l’attivazione di procedure sostitutive.

[…]”

Quindi per un ritardo di non più di 25 giorni, l’indennizzo automatico previsto dal TICA sarà di “5% del totale del corrispettivo per la connessione per ogni giorno lavorativo di ritardo della realizzazione della connessione”.

Ma se il ritardo eccessivo è superiore a 25 giorni lavorativi, allora il 18.7 aggiunge all’indennizzo specificato nel TICA anche il seguente indennizzo “I”:

I = 1.000 x (inc_ottenibile - inc_ottenuto) x 20 x (Pimm – (0,8 x P))

dove:

“inc_ottenibile - inc_ottenuto” è la quantità di tariffa che hai perduto, espressa in €/kWh,

“Pimm” è la potenza in immissione richiesta, espressa in kW, e

“P” è la potenza ai fini della connessione, espressa in kW.

Ovviamente la formula è errata, perché alla fine le unità dell’indennizzo escono come “€/h” invece di “€”.  Quindi fra il “1.000” e il “20” ci sarebbe stata un’unità di “h” che ora è sparita.  Presumibilmente questi due sarebbero stati all’origine “1.000 h/anno” e “20 anni”.  Il primo sarebbe stato un modo di esprimere in ore annuali il capacity factor dell’impianto, in questo caso presunto a 1.000 / 8.760 = 11.4%, che è bassotto per il Nord Italia, e molto basso per il Sud, mentre il secondo sarebbe stato la durata degli incentivi per l’impianto.

Comunque, nel caso in cui il gestore di rete non ti ha fornito nessuna disponibilità connettiva affatto, allora riceverai il massimo possibile da questo indennizzo, cioè:

1.000 x la potenza che vuoi immettere x 20 x la differenza in tariffa perduta

Insomma se il ritardo eccessivo duri più di 25 giorno, dal 26esimo giorno in poi avrai diritto – dal gestore di rete – ad un importo uguale a quanto in più un tale impianto con c.f. di 11.4% avrebbe guadagnato in 20 anni a quella tariffa più alta che hai perso.  Questo diritto nasce sin dal 26esimo giorno.  Quanto alle tempistiche per il pagamento dell’indennizzo, si può semplificare leggermente il 18.8 e dire che nel caso di grossi impianti il gestore di rete deve darti 40% di questo importo entro 90 giorni dalla presentazione di una richiesta completa, e gli altri 60% in rate annuali entro 3 anni dalla data di richiesta.

Nel mio parere l’indennizzo per un ritardo eccessivo inferiore a 25 giorni non è sufficiente se questo breve ritardo ti farà perdere una tariffa più alta per 20 anni.  L’indennizzo per un ritardo superiore a 25 giorni, però, mi sembra equo, e il fatto che loro presumono per te un capacity factor di solo 11.4% è compensato dal fatto che riceverai tutto questo denaro assai presto nella vita del tuo impianto (tutto entro 3 anni).

Una cosa che mi preoccupa un po’ è il fatto che è lo stesso “gestore di rete” che deve rispondere alla tua richiesta e pagarti senza mormorazione e senza indugio tutti questi soldi.  Non c’è in questo forse un piccolo conflitto di interessi?  Non vedo nell’Articolo 18 una via di ricorso, quindi non so quale ente si assumerà la responsabilità nel caso in cui il gestore di rete tenta di fare qualcosa furba.  Per ritardi fino a 25 giorni l’Allegato A ci rimanda in parte al TICA, e il 14.2 del TICA ammette la scappatoia “salvo cause di forza maggiore o cause imputabili al richiedente o a terzi”.  E si trova fraseologia un po’ simile nell’Articolo 18: “Nel caso in cui i giorni lavorativi di ritardo imputabili al gestore di rete siano…”

Quindi vedo per il gestore di rete un incentivo altissimo per avere sempre presente a mano un assortimento di cause potenzialmente imputabili (anche se poco dimostrabili) ai richiedenti o a terzi di cui servirsi nel caso di ritardi che arrivano al 26esimo giorno.

Si trova forse un altra scappatoia nel TICA: “14.2 Qualora la realizzazione della connessione non avvenga entro i tempi previsti dal comma 10.1…”

Ecco il comma 10.1 del TICA:

“10.1 Nel caso di:

a) lavori semplici, il tempo di realizzazione della connessione è pari, al massimo, a 30 (trenta) giorni lavorativi;

b) lavori complessi, il tempo di realizzazione della connessione è pari, al massimo, a 90 (novanta) giorni lavorativi, aumentato di 15 (quindici) giorni lavorativi per ogni km di linea da realizzare in media tensione eccedente il primo chilometro.”

Ma qual è la differenza tra “lavori semplici” e “lavori complessi”?

“1.1

[…]

t) lavori complessi sono la realizzazione, modifica o sostituzione a regola d’arte dell’impianto del gestore di rete in tutti i casi non compresi nella definizione di lavori semplici;

u) lavori semplici sono la realizzazione, modifica o sostituzione a regola d’arte dell’impianto del gestore di rete eseguita con un intervento limitato alla presa ed eventualmente al gruppo di misura;

[…]”

Perciò vedo, nel caso in cui il gestore di rete non riesce a fare un collegamento entro 30 giorni, una fortissima motivazione per esso per cercare qualsiasi pretesto (anche non dimostrabile) per dire che il lavoro che è in ritardo richieda – sul proprio impianto del gestore di rete – qualcosa aldilà di “un intervento limitato alla presa ed eventualmente al gruppo di misura”.